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INTRODUCTION
The onward march of employment discrimination law began with
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 It has proceeded in fits
and starts since then, but almost always in the direction of expansion,
resulting in the coverage of new grounds of discrimination and new
groups protected by the law. This process began with the addition of
sex to the prohibitions in Title VII.2 It gained momentum in the enact-
ment of wholly separate statutes, exemplified by the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)3 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).4 The emerging coverage of discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity repre-
sents only the most recent example of this trend, which has been
met with overwhelming approval in scholarly commentary.5
* John Barbee Minor Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701–18, 78 Stat. 253
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012)) [hereinafter Title VII].
2. See Section III.B infra.
3. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2012)) [hereinafter ADEA].
4. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)) [hereinafter ADA].
5. For endorsement of the decisions on coverage of sexual orientation, see William
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Despite the accolades that have usually greeted this trend, it has
nevertheless left deepening concerns in its wake. The most troubling
involves groups beyond the immediate focus of existing prohibitions
against discrimination, typically identified as working-class whites.
As the prohibitions against discrimination multiply, and claims of
discrimination increase, these groups find themselves consigned only
to claims of “reverse discrimination.”6 The resulting resentment has
led mainstream Democrats and other political moderates to attribute
the election of Donald Trump to their party’s pursuit of “identity poli-
tics.”7 This term itself resists definition, oscillating between political
solicitude for minority groups, with varying degrees of justification;
to the refusal to build coalitions by appealing to a wider constituency;
to self-absorbed obsession with one’s own status as a victim.8 Dis-
aggregated discrimination, with its recognition of different rules for
different forms of discrimination, and seemingly for different groups,
appears to take a first, fateful step down this slippery slope. The next
steps lead to political isolation of minorities and other historically
disfavored groups and then to eventual defeat at the hands of erst-
while populists and narrow-minded nationalists. As William Butler
Yeats said, in that situation, “The best lack all conviction, while the
worst [a]re full of passionate intensity.”9
Further steps down the path towards self-defeating identity poli-
tics, however, hardly follow from the recognition of the fact of disaggre-
gated discrimination, or so this Article argues. Part I distinguishes
between discrimination as a denial of equal citizenship and discrimi-
nation as favoritism for “protected classes.” In fact, there are few such
classes to be found in the laws against employment discrimination,
which usually cover “any individual,” and those that have narrower
coverage reach broadly defined classes, such as everyone age forty or
older under the ADEA.10 Identity politics, in the sense of an exclusive
focus on certain “protected classes,” loses sight of the broad coverage
of laws against discrimination, and with it, their foundation in prin-
ciples of equal citizenship. Part II surveys the development of the
specific provisions that implement the laws against employment
N. Eskridge Jr., Title VII’s Statutory History and the Sex Discrimination Argument for
LGBT Workplace Protections, 127 YALE. L.J. 322, 383 (2017). For a representative sample
of essays on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Title VII, see David F. Engstrom, The
Civil Rights Act at Fifty: Past, Present, Future, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1195, 1197–1201 (2014);
George Rutherglen, Title VII as Precedent: Past and Prologue for Future Legislation, 10
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 159, 160 (2014).
6. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xiii (1977).
7. MARK LILLA, THE ONCE AND FUTURE LIBERAL: AFTER IDENTITY POLITICS 14–15
(2017).
8. Id. at 15.
9. WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, THE SECOND COMING (1919).
10. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2012).
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discrimination. The expanded prohibitions in Title VII, the ADEA, and
the ADA have been accompanied by numerous qualifications and ex-
ceptions. The law has mediated the harsh consequences of strict pro-
hibitions by this means. Part III brings this point down to the concrete
terms of current disputes over the expanded coverage of Title VII,
with specific attention to affirmative action, sexual harassment, sexual
orientation and gender identity, and religious accommodation. Part IV
then examines the ways in which the ADEA and the ADA have trans-
formed narrow provisions on coverage into broad protections of almost
everyone. The more extreme claims for special treatment under these
statutes have been transformed, deflected, and qualified to avoid the
implications of identity politics. A brief conclusion acknowledges the
inevitability of controversy over discrimination but takes it as an
opportunity to bring the claims of rival groups to a successful settle-
ment through compromises in implementation.
I. IDENTITY POLITICS AND EQUAL CITIZENSHIP
As employment discrimination law has expanded in scope, so has
its differentiation into specific provisions applied to different forms
of discrimination. This trajectory needs explanation and interpreta-
tion, not deployment into a zero-sum game of “us against them,” in
which the immediate beneficiaries of laws like Title VII gain at the
expense of other groups. The overriding appeal of the law must be
the ideal of equal citizenship—the opportunity that everyone should
have to participate in public life, whether provided by the government
or by private institutions in the marketplace of economics, education,
and ideas. It is the opposite of “identity politics,” defined as the ex-
clusive appeal to historically disfavored groups rather than those
groups that feel disfavored today.11
Of course, any term that characterizes a political tendency or
argument can be used to engage in “persuasive definition”: the effort
to characterize opposing views as unworthy of acceptance.12 Like the
epithet, “political correctness,” “identity politics” can be deployed sim-
ply to portray any argument in favor of progressive causes as an ex-
emplar of reflexive liberal conformity. People cannot, however, be
expected to shed their identity when they enter the courthouse or the
voting booth or the forum of public debate. Identity politics, in this
sense, is unexceptional. The term is informative only to the extent
11. LILLA, supra note 7, at 14–15.
12. Or, more precisely, as stated in the classic account by C.L. Stevenson: “A ‘PER-
SUASIVE’ definition is one which gives a new conceptual meaning to a familiar word
without substantially changing its emotive meaning, and which is used with the conscious
or unconscious purpose of changing, by this means, the direction of people’s interests.”
C.L. Stevenson, Persuasive Definition, 47 MIND 331, 331 (1938).
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that it refers to specific pathologies of political and legal argument.
The particular pathology that the term identifies is the focus upon
one or a few admissible identities, excluding all others and leading
to a refusal to compromise on strict prohibitions by excluding rather
than accommodating the legitimate concerns of people with compet-
ing identities.
“Identity politics” in this sense can be found as much on the right
as on the left. Appeals to absolute prohibitions against discrimina-
tion, whether against any form of affirmative action or against any
accommodation of religious practices, exclude from discourse the
competing views of rival groups, and as a practical matter neglect
the qualified and nuanced character of the law as it has evolved. The
law does not give weight to the “external preferences” people have—
preferences not directly over how to lead their own lives, but indirectly
over their approval or disapproval of the preferences of others in
leading their lives.13 Distaste for the religious beliefs or the sexual
practices of others cannot be used to exclude their views from con-
sideration and to invoke abstract arguments to support absolute
prohibitions. To invert an observation by Ronald Dworkin, what we
need is “justificatory descent” to more concrete levels of analysis,
rather than “justificatory ascent” to higher levels of abstraction.14
The development of employment discrimination law has not
proceeded in a straight line. Nor should it. It has been marked by
continuity in statutory prohibitions and departures in coverage and
exceptions.15 Sometimes minor differences in wording of different
prohibitions have resulted in significant changes in interpretation.16
The resulting discrepancies counsel against the quest for uniformity
based on the essential nature of discrimination, rather than seeking
workable adjustments that take account of the distinctive character
of different forms of discrimination in different settings. Arguments
of principle that have untoward consequences that impose undue
burdens on innocent parties lose their force in this process. The charge
of practicing identity politics through litigation underestimates the
mediating role of reducing general principles to decisions in concrete
cases.17 The abiding and inherent defect of identity politics, on this
view, lies in the neglect of legitimate interests opposed to strict en-
forcement of laws against discrimination. Individuals with those
interests, who are not themselves the usual victims of discrimination,
do not receive the “equal concern and respect” that they are entitled
13. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 234–35.
14. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 52–53 (2006).
15. Rutherglen, supra note 5, at 166–67.
16. Id. at 167.
17. LILLA, supra note 7, at 37.
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to as citizens.18 The charge of engaging in identity politics does not
reliably pick out liberal or conservative results to be condemned, but
the form that those results take and the failures of argument that
lead to them. What might work to promote equal citizenship in some
circumstances might defeat it in others.
The context in which different forms of discrimination trigger
different legal treatment bears this out. The elaboration of legal doc-
trine to address particular problems reveals an affinity for variety
as much as uniformity. This is not to argue that the concept of dis-
crimination should be jettisoned in favor of some, as yet, unarticulated
alternative. It is, instead, to recognize how much complexity the con-
cept of discrimination invites, and as a practical matter, requires. This
insight takes the law in a more pragmatic direction than adherence
to a formal and conceptual approach to analyzing discrimination.
Such an approach still has its uses, but these must be justified on
pragmatic grounds, in terms of the results achieved rather than any
basis in original meaning or abstract theory.
Philosophical theories of equality have moved in the same
pluralistic direction. While some philosophers and historians have
questioned the viability of appeals to equality generally,19 others have
sought to break them down into more compelling components, notably
T.M. Scanlon in his recent book, Why Does Inequality Matter?20 He
identifies several different objections to inequality, which could equally
apply to unlawful discrimination: denial of equal concern, preservation
of status differences, lack of procedural fairness, limits on opportu-
nity, and restrictions on political participation.21 He also addresses
several specific arguments over inequality: as related to liberty and
coercion, to desert, and to unequal incomes.22 His approach through-
out looks to a variety of specific objections to inequality, not in terms
of abstract theory but in terms of actual institutional practice.23
Scanlon’s pluralist and concrete approach contrasts markedly
with recently proposed theories of discrimination, which seek unity at
a high level of conceptual abstraction. These theories have sought to
18. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 180 (“We might say that individuals have a right to
equal concern and respect in the design and administration of the political institutions
that govern them.”).
19. HARRY G. FRANKFURT, ON INEQUALITY xi (2015) (“[I]t is misguided to endorse
economic egalitarianism as an authentic moral ideal.”); WALTER SCHEIDEL, THE GREAT
LEVELER: VIOLENCE AND THE HISTORY OF INEQUALITY FROM THE STONE AGE TO THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 6–9 (2017) (plague, revolution, state collapse, and war have been
the historic causes of increased equality).
20. T.M. SCANLON, WHY DOES INEQUALITY MATTER? 1 (2018).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1–10.
23. Id. at 8–9.
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justify prohibitions against discrimination by appeal to goals as vari-
ous as preventing demeaning distinctions based on personal char-
acteristics, like race and sex,24 or dismantling bottlenecks to individual
opportunity by creating a plurality of ways for people to advance,25
or preventing comparative harm to the victims of discrimination,26
or eliminating pervasive, abiding, and relative disadvantage among
certain groups.27 The very multiplicity of these theories undermines
their claim to completeness. If more than one is plausible, then none
appears to be complete and exclusive of the others. None provides the
whole story of why discrimination is wrong. Moreover, these theories
operate at such a high level of abstraction that they tacitly admit the
need for compromise as they are reduced to operational prohibitions.
The proliferation of legal prohibitions against employment discrimina-
tion, and the exceptions and qualifications that have accompanied
them, reveal how expansion of coverage has generated divergence
in content.
II. PROHIBITIONS, EXCEPTIONS, AND EXTENSIONS
The expanding prohibitions against employment discrimination
have resulted in multiplying variations, exceptions, and qualifica-
tions. Each new ground of discrimination and each issue of coverage
raises questions about how it relates to established prohibitions.
Expanded coverage challenges the understanding of existing prohi-
bitions and requires them to be re-examined. The ongoing contro-
versy over religious objections to serving gay customers illustrates
how prohibitions against discrimination can collide, in this instance,
between the emerging protection of sexual orientation and the long-
standing protection of religious belief and practices.28 Consensus
easily forms around paradigm cases of discrimination, historically
those on the basis of race, but the implications to be drawn from even
the clearest cases invariably raise problems of their own. Affirmative
action has been the site of such controversies from the beginning, da-
ting back to the original congressional debates over Title VII.29 Rea-
sonable accommodation of religion, disability, and now to some extent,
pregnancy, raises similar issues.30 How can employers be required
24. DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 169 (2008).
25. JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 82 (2014).
26. KASPER LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, BORN FREE AND EQUAL? A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY
INTO THE NATURE OF DISCRIMINATION 8 (2014).
27. TARUNABH KHAITAN, A THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 18 (2015).
28. See infra Section III.D.
29. 110 Cong. Rec. 1518, 6549 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id. at 7213 (remarks
of Sens. Clark and Case). See infra Section III.A.
30. See infra Section III.D.
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to avoid discrimination on these grounds by taking account of the in-
dividual characteristic that they are otherwise required to disregard?
These are only the most salient questions arising from the ex-
pansion of Title VII. Different grounds of discrimination and differ-
ent groups receive different treatment, resulting in the elaboration
of legal doctrine as notable for its variability as for its uniformity.
This is not to argue that the concept of discrimination should be dis-
carded. It is, instead, to recognize how much complexity the concept
of discrimination invites—and as a practical matter, requires—in
the development of legal doctrine.
A. Title VII
According to a leading decision of the Supreme Court, “disparate
treatment” or intentional discrimination “is the most easily under-
stood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people
less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.”31 The complexity of the statutory prohibitions
against employment discrimination belies this simplicity. They are
complicated in their own right and their complications multiply as
they are augmented by exceptions and extensions. We begin with
Title VII and then move on to the prohibitions modeled on it in the
ADEA and the ADA.
The main prohibition in Title VII reveals the immediate obsta-
cles presented to any simple definition of prohibited discrimination.
If the definition is so simple, why does the prohibition have to go on
at such length? Section 703(a) makes it unlawful for an employer “to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual” and “to limit, segregate, or clas-
sify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin.”32 Additional prohibitions apply to employment agencies, labor
unions, and joint labor-management committees.33
The likely purpose of such elaborate and redundant prohibitions
appears to be to prevent evasion, drawing on the reaction of south-
ern school districts to the desegregation ordered in Brown v. Board
of Education.34 Hence the meaning of “discriminate” is amplified by
31. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
32. Title VII § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
33. Title VII § 703(b)–(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b)–(d) (2012).
34. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). For an account of the reaction to Brown, see MICHAEL
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“fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual” in subsection
(a)(1) and by “limit, segregate, or classify” in subsection (a)(2).35 Title
VII disaggregates discrimination from the very beginning. The simi-
lar, but not identical, prohibitions applicable to employment agencies,
labor unions, and joint labor-management committees make this
tendency all the more explicit.36
The literal terms of the prohibitions in Title VII just start the
process of disaggregation. Several exceptions and elaborations follow
immediately upon them. Those of most general significance concern
affirmative action, bona fide occupational qualifications, religious
discrimination, seniority systems, testing, and mixed-motive cases.37
Four separate provisions address affirmative action in one way or
another: one allowing discrimination in favor of Native Americans
on or near Indian reservations; another disclaiming any required
form of affirmative action; another prohibiting affirmative action by
adjusting test scores; and a final provision dealing with collateral
attack upon court orders.38 The last two of these provisions were
added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, along with an uncodified pro-
nouncement that nothing in that act “shall be construed to affect
court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation agree-
ments, that are in accordance with the law.”39 Right from the begin-
ning, and continuing to the most recent systematic amendments to
Title VII, affirmative action generated its own separate set of excep-
tions and extensions.
The exception for bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQ)
has not spawned as many different statutory provisions and it eventu-
ally received “an extremely narrow” interpretation.40 Yet it has proved
to be consequential, mainly for signaling the permissibility of some
classifications on the basis of sex, although it also applies to na-
tional origin and religion. For national origin, the exception is still
narrower than it is for sex because national origin has been assimi-
lated to race in constitutional law.41 As discussed more fully in the
J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 344–442 (2004).
35. Title VII §§ 703(a)(1), (2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), (2) (2012).
36. See Title VII §§ 703(b)–(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b)–(c) (2012).
37. See Rutherglen, supra note 5, at 179–80.
38. Title VII § 703(i), (j), (k), (n), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i), (j), (k), (n) (2012).
39. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, § 116, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991).
40. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
41. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 189–90 n.19 (1982)
(raising the issue whether Japanese citizenship could be a BFOQ for certain positions
in American subsidiary of Japanese corporation); Fisher v. University of Texas, 136 S. Ct.
2198, 2210, 2212 (2016) (affirmative action for Blacks and Hispanics must meet the stan-
dards of strict scrutiny).
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next part, religion has received exceptional treatment mainly through
exemptions from coverage, either express or implied, for religious
institutions and ministerial positions.42 It also has been protected
through a duty of reasonable accommodation for religious practices.
The other special provisions in Title VII confirm the centrifugal
tendencies created by extension to different grounds of discrimination
and different employment practices. The provisions on testing, dispa-
rate impact, and mixed motives43 have the greatest range and signif-
icance and will be taken up in the next part of this Article.44 These
provisions all address, in one way or another, the issue whether and
to what extent intent must be proved to establish a violation of Title
VII. These issues have captured much attention, particularly because
they differentiate statutory prohibitions against discrimination from
constitutional prohibitions. That, too, illustrates how disaggregated
the laws against discrimination have become. The prohibitions against
discrimination on the basis of age and the basis of disability exem-
plify the same tendencies.
B. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
The ADEA was based on a report from the Secretary of Labor
commissioned by Title VII itself.45 The ADEA’s main prohibitions
largely copy those in Title VII.46 The exceptions start in the same
vein, with a BFOQ and an exception for seniority, but then veer off
to issues specific to age, such as retirement and pension benefits.47
The Act also is notable for the provisions it does not carry over from
Title VII, like those on mixed motives and disparate impact.48 It
does contain a defense for employment decisions based on “reason-
able factors other than age,”49 but this defense has proved to be of
limited significance because of the prevalence of “legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason[s]” as a defense to all forms of discrimination.50
42. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171,
196 (2012).
43. Title VII § 703(h), (k), (m), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), (k), (m) (2012).
44. Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Leg-
islative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151
U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1501–02 (2003).
45. Title VII § 715, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 265–66 (1964).
46. ADEA § 4(a)–(c), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)–(c) (2012).
47. ADEA § 4(f), (i), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f), (i) (2012).
48. Title VII § 703(k), (m), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k), (m) (2012).
49. ADEA § 4(f)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2012).
50. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). This particular
provision in the ADEA applies mainly to shift the burden of proof onto the defendant in
disparate impact cases to establish a “reasonable factor[ ] other than age.” Meacham v.
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, Inc., 554 U.S. 84, 91–95 (2008).
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The differences between the ADEA and Title VII take on added
significance because of the expansion of the ADEA’s coverage. The
Act originally covered only individuals from age 40 to age 64, but the
ceiling on coverage first was raised to age 69, and then abandoned
altogether for most occupations.51 The implications of this change
are discussed in detail in the last part of this Article.52 Of immediate
significance is the limitation at the opposite end of the age spectrum.
The floor on coverage has been invoked to reject claims of reverse
discrimination under the Act—discrimination in favor of older workers
against younger workers.53 Even if both workers are covered by the
Act, it protects only the older worker from discrimination on the
basis of age.54
Translated into constitutional principles, no heightened scrutiny
attaches to affirmative action in favor of older workers.55 Indeed, a
little thought reveals that any such heightened judicial review would
call into question established programs like Social Security and Medi-
care. In fact, the Supreme Court has held that classifications on the
basis of age, even if they operate against older individuals, receive
only rational basis review.56 This difference in the constitutional
background presents a stark contrast with the forms of discrimina-
tion prohibited by Title VII, all of which trigger “strict scrutiny” or
must have “an exceedingly persuasive justification” if the govern-
ment engages in them.57 The difference in constitutional standards
illustrates, yet again, just how pervasively disaggregated the con-
cept of discrimination is. It extends beyond technical differences in
the wording of statutes to principles of constitutional law.
C. The Americans with Disabilities Act
The ADA picks up where the ADEA leaves off by adding its own
set of variations on the themes announced by Title VII. Where the
ADEA permits discrimination in favor of older workers, the ADA
requires discrimination in favor of disabled workers in the form of
51. See infra notes 165–68 and accompanying text.
52. Rutherglen, supra note 5, at 174–75.
53. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 586–94 (2004).
54. Id. (“[T]he ADEA was concerned to protect a relatively old worker from discrimi-
nation that works to the advantage of the relatively young.”).
55. Rutherglen, supra note 5, at 174–75.
56. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (per curiam) (not necessary
to subject age-based classifications to “strict judicial scrutiny”) (quotation marks omitted).
57. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729
(2018) (state’s clear hostility to sincere religious beliefs violates the First Amendment);
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2209–10 (2016) (university has “continuing obliga-
tion to satisfy the burden of strict scrutiny” for consideration of race and national origin
in admissions decisions); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (state clas-
sifications on the basis of gender must have “exceedingly persuasive justification”).
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the duty of reasonable accommodation.58 That particular phrase
originated in the protection of religious practices under Title VII.59
It made its way into the ADA by way of regulations under the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973,60 which then led to incorporation of the duty
as one among several specific provisions adopted as a “construction”
of the duty not to discriminate in the ADA.61
The need to crystalize the duty not to discriminate in more
specific duties carried the trend towards disaggregation one step
further, adding provisions on practices with adverse effects on indi-
viduals with a disability, protecting association with such individuals,
and preventing contractual relationships that discriminate against
such individuals.62 The main prohibitions in Title VII survive in the
general prohibition against discrimination and a provision on segre-
gation.63 Separate provisions restrict inquiries about disabilities and
all of the prohibitions are subject to several defenses: for qualifica-
tion standards that are “job-related and consistent with business
necessity,” for standards that screen out individuals who pose “a
direct threat” to the health or safety of others or who pose a risk of
transmitting infectious or communicable diseases; and for exclusion
based on the use of illegal drugs and the use of alcohol at work.64
The duty of reasonable accommodation itself is subject to a defense
for “undue hardship.”65
The proliferating prohibitions and exceptions under the ADA
revolve around the distinction between disabilities that do or that do
not detract from an individual’s qualifications for the job, with or with-
out reasonable accommodation. Strictly speaking, the inquiry into
qualifications goes to coverage since a plaintiff must be “a qualified
individual” to be protected from discrimination on the basis of dis-
ability.66 Who is protected by a statute, of course, is deeply intertwined
with what they are protected from. In this respect, too, the ADA fol-
lows the ADEA in restricting coverage to select individuals, rather
than to “any individual,” as under Title VII.67 Focusing the act in this
way brings out the tension between protecting individuals with a
disability and allowing employers only to hire individuals qualified
58. ADA § 102(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (2012).
59. Title VII § 701(i), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(i) (2012).
60. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 700–96); 34
C.F.R. § 104.12 (2017).
61. ADA § 102(a), (b), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b) (2012).
62. ADA § 102(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (2012).
63. Id.
64. ADA §§ 102(b)(6), (7), (d), 103(a), (b), 104, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(6), (7), (d),
12113(a), (b), 12114 (2012).
65. ADA § 102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012).
66. ADA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012).
67. Title VII § 703(a)–(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)–(d) (2012).
402 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.              [Vol. 26:391
for the job. No such inherent tension arises under Title VII because
race, national origin, color, sex, and religion almost never bear any
relation at all to the ability to perform a job. The aspiration of the
ADA might be, over the long term, to make disabilities similarly
irrelevant to job performance, but it must be tempered by the immedi-
ate need for employers to make decisions based on existing qualifi-
cations and available accommodations.
III. TITLE VII COVERAGE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Apart from the exceptions just noted in the ADEA and the ADA,
the protection of laws against employment discrimination purports
to be universal. This principle dates back to the Civil Rights Act of
1866 which protected “all persons born in the United States and not
subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed.”68 The
exclusion of Native Americans who remained subject to tribal juris-
diction has since been dropped, but it has influenced coverage on the
defendant side, as we shall soon see. On the plaintiff side, coverage
extended to everyone as a necessary corollary to the requirement of
equal treatment. As a sponsor of the 1866 Act stated, “this bill applies
to white men as well as black men.”69 If it did not, the Act itself would
have violated the requirement of equal treatment regardless of race.
Yet universal coverage still admits of variation in how different groups
are covered, inviting claims of special treatment and charges of iden-
tity politics. Nowhere is this more evident than with respect to af-
firmative action, which has posed problems of interpretation for
decades under the Constitution and Title VII.
A. The Prolonged Stalemate over Affirmative Action
As noted earlier, the only clear and explicit provision in Title
VII permitting affirmative action concerns employment of Native
Americans on or near a reservation.70 It is augmented by the exclu-
sion of Native American tribes entirely from coverage under the
statutory definition of “employer.”71 To many this may appear to be
a small point in a statute that otherwise comprehensively prohibits
racial discrimination in employment. Yet that does not detract from
its significance. If this exception to the prohibition against racial
discrimination can be justified, why not others?
The Supreme Court addressed exactly this question in Morton
v. Mancari, which extended the Native American exceptions in Title
68. Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
69. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 599 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull).
70. Title VII § 703(i), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i) (2012).
71. Title VII § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012).
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VII to employment by the federal government.72 Non-Indian employ-
ees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs alleged reverse discrimination in
the Bureau’s preference for Native Americans.73 The Court held that
the preference reflected longstanding federal policy, and while the
preference was not within the literal terms of the exceptions in Title
VII, those exceptions reflected continuation of the policy when Title
VII was amended to apply to the federal government.74 Moreover,
the Bureau’s policy conformed to the Constitution because it fostered
the important interest in Indian self-government.75
Despite a disclaimer in the opinion, none of the rationales offered
in Morton v. Mancari escapes from consideration of race. The federal
policy favors members of federally recognized tribes, defined as
having “one-fourth or more [degree of] Indian blood.”76 The constitu-
tional principle of favoring Indian self-government also applies to
Native Americans alone, as the Supreme Court made clear in invali-
dating a preference in favor of native Hawaiians.77 From the specific
policy of the Bureau of Indian Affairs to general propositions of con-
stitutional law, the presence of race as a factor was decisive. To write
off the decision, and the accompanying provisions in Title VII, as iso-
lated exceptions simply begs the question. Each racial and ethnic
group can argue for special treatment based on its legacy.
Surprisingly, the implications of special treatment reach deep
into the prevalent theories of liability under Title VII. Thus the
most widely cited method of proving individual claims of intentional
discrimination, under McDonnell Douglas v. Green, begins by requir-
ing proof that the plaintiff “belongs to a racial minority.”78 This re-
quirement does not exclude claims of reverse discrimination by white
employees,79 but it does make it easier for minority plaintiffs to estab-
lish a prima facie case.80 In most circuits, majority employees cannot
take advantage of the structure of proof in McDonnell Douglas.81
Likewise, majority employees cannot take advantage of claims of
72. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 545–51 (1974).
73. Id. at 539.
74. Id. at 547–48.
75. Id. at 553–54.
76. Id. at 553 n.24.
77. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 518–22 (2000).
78. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
79. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278–85 (1976).
80. See Martinez v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 703 F.3d 911, 915 (6th
Cir. 2013) (reverse discrimination plaintiff must typically “demonstrate background
circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who
discriminates against the majority”). But see Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d
1321, 1325 n.15 (11th Cir. 2011) (no need for reverse discrimination plaintiff to prove such
“background circumstances”).
81. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117
HARV. L. REV. 493, 523 (2003).
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disparate impact, at least to the same extent as minority employ-
ees.82 Otherwise, employers would be put in the untenable position
of being exposed to liability no matter what employment practices
they adopted. As Justice Stevens pointed out long ago, “[e]ven a com-
pletely neutral practice will inevitably have some disproportionate
impact on one group or another. Griggs does not imply, and this
Court has never held, that discrimination must always be inferred
from such consequences.”83
The constitutional law of affirmative action has not moved much
beyond the basic terms of the compromise decision in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke: explicit goals for minority enroll-
ment violate the Constitution, while consideration of race among a
variety of factors intended to promote diversity does not.84 Critics of
affirmative action have argued for its abolition, some in opinions of
the Supreme Court.85 The Court has nevertheless not yet declared
that the time for affirmative action is up. The seesawing decisions
in Fisher v. University of Texas86 have, if anything, made the current
state of the law murkier still.
Decisions under Title VII have exhibited more movement away
from approval of affirmative action. In a sense, they had nowhere
else to go, since they started from the very permissive standards for
affirmative action adopted in Weber v. United Steelworkers.87 That
decision has not been disapproved by the Supreme Court, but nei-
ther has it been cited in recent decisions. The most recent, Ricci v.
DeStefano, devises an elaborate structure of shifting burdens of proof
that has little, if any, basis in the statute itself.88 The Court created an
exception to the statute’s prohibition on intentional discrimination
in order to allow employers to engage in race-conscious actions in
order to limit their liability for practices with discriminatory effects.89
82. Id. at 525–26; Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate
Impact Claims by White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505, 1526–27 (2004).
83. City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710 n.20
(1978) (emphasis in original).
84. 438 U.S. 265, 315–23 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
85. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
748 (2007) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating
on the basis of race.”).
86. 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013) (reversing summary judgment for the university and
remanding for reconsideration); 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2210 (2016) (affirming summary judg-
ment for the university).
87. 443 U.S. 193, 208–09 (1979) (affirmative action by employers must be “designed
to break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy” and “not unnecessarily
trammel the interests of white employees”).
88. 557 U.S. 557, 585 (2009) (race-conscious action by employer allowed to counter
“a strong basis in evidence of an impermissible disparate impact”).
89. Id. at 630–31.
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That exception is drawn far more narrowly than the standards for
permissible affirmative action in Weber.
Critics of affirmative action would do away with all these com-
plications by the simple doctrinal fix of abandoning affirmative action
altogether. That proposal has appealing simplicity, but it would run
into problems with the exceptions in Title VII for affirmative action
on behalf of Native Americans. These might be dismissed as man-
ageable problems in practice since Native Americans are a small
percentage of the population. Yet that does not hold true in the south-
west, where Native Americans are a significant minority, and in any
event, the exceptional treatment of Native Americans under Title VII
serves as a warning of larger problems. In individual claims of dis-
parate treatment, membership in a minority group figures in proof
of discrimination by circumstantial evidence and class claims of dispa-
rate impact do not work at all in favor of members of the majority,
however that is defined. These problems, too, could be solved, most
plausibly by expanding the availability of these theories of liability
to all plaintiffs, whether minority or majority. That solution would,
however, create problems of its own, like those under the ADEA of
maintaining the distinction between federal claims of age discrimi-
nation and state claims of wrongful discharge. Would a plaintiff get
to the jury just by showing good performance on the job and dis-
missal for reasons that the employer could not adequately defend?
If the plaintiff were required to show worse treatment than someone
from another racial group, that would either be too much or too little—
too much in presuming that some racial group receives better treat-
ment all the time or too little in inviting the plaintiff just to find one
employee from a different group who received better treatment.
The difficulty in resolving all these issues arises from the disjunc-
tion between ostensibly universal coverage and racially sensitive
theories of recovery. Seen in this light, differential standards for
permissible affirmative action just constitute the most obvious
manifestation of this tension. As long as the tension persists, the
deadlock over affirmative action will persist. This observation offers
one explanation for the uneasy stasis in the law of affirmative
action—a grudging and uncomfortable acknowledgment that some
affirmative action is necessary without any clear resolution of its
permissible scope. A justification, rather than a description, of this
compromise is harder to come by, as volumes of scholarship on
affirmative action attest.90
The justification offered here is minimalist. The stalemate over
affirmative action is exactly what should be expected as universal
90. For a review of the literature, see Stephen M. Rich, What Diversity Contributes
to Equal Opportunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1011 (2016).
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coverage and equal treatment encounter the pragmatic needs of com-
pliance and enforcement. In Ricci v. DeStefano, the Supreme Court
accepted some version of this argument, as do the many decisions
recognizing the need to inject some reference to racial groups in the
proof of claims of discrimination.91 Having accepted a degree of race
consciousness in these situations, courts could accept affirmative
action so long as it does not impose an undue burden on groups not
favored by the program in question. Of course, they don’t have to, and
as currently constituted, the Supreme Court might not continue to do
so. It certainly would not accept programs that impose concentrated
burdens on individuals from other groups. The question whether to
allow affirmative action subject to these constraints is open. The
concept of discrimination does not, by itself, close it off.
B. Sexual Harassment
The same pattern of interaction between coverage and substan-
tive prohibitions also emerges in the cases on sexual harassment.
Special standards apply to employer liability for sexual harassment
under Title VII, for three separate reasons. First, under prevailing law
in the circuits, the harassing employee is not an employer covered
by Title VII.92 Hence the primary wrongdoer can only be held liable
under state law. Second, Title VII has had remarkable success in
expanding the employment of women in the work force.93 Whether
or not it is solely or mainly responsible for the steady increase in
women’s employment since its enactment, it has coincided with this
striking trend. The expanded employment of women has effectively
expanded the coverage of the prohibition against sexual harassment.
And third, a recurring practical problem in enforcement of this pro-
hibition has been the reluctance of women to come forward to com-
plain about sexual harassment. The #MeToo movement makes it
clear that even very prominent women have been reluctant to com-
plain if they fear retaliation. The special standards for liability for
sexual harassment try to address this problem.
The failure of Title VII to cover harassing employees as defen-
dants represents a serious omission, one that the lower federal
courts have justified because of the numerical limit on coverage of
employers.94 Private employers must have at least fifteen employees
to be covered under the statute.95 This reasoning has some force, but
91. Id. at 1068.
92. Id. at 1037–40.
93. Id. at 1049–50.
94. Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 100 F.3d 1061, 1077–78 (3d Cir. 1996); see
Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., 55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing cases).
95. Title VII § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012).
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it neglects the coverage of “any agent of such a person” which ap-
pears immediately after the numerical threshold on coverage.96 The
practical significance of the exclusion of employees might be limited
by the availability of claims against them under state law, as a matter
of tort or of state fair employment practice laws. Nevertheless, it
has needlessly complicated the standards for liability for sexual ha-
rassment. The Supreme Court has analyzed employer liability under
the Restatement (Second) of Agency.97 If the reference to “any agent”
in the statute itself does not trigger individual liability,98 how does
a restatement on the same subject affect the scope of employer lia-
bility? In any event, the Supreme Court reasoned from the Restate-
ment to the conclusion that employers could be held strictly liable
for harassment by their supervisors, particularly if the plaintiff took
reasonable steps to complain of the harassment.99
The practical consequences of Title VII have worked an effective
expansion of coverage on the plaintiff side. In 1960, the labor force
participation rate of women age 25 to 64 ranged from 30% to 48%
depending upon age.100 In 1990, the corresponding figures were 36%
to 78%.101 While the women with the lowest participation rate, age
60 to 64, did not change dramatically, the employment of younger
women did.102 Exactly how much of this increase is attributable to
laws like Title VII remains a complicated question. Perhaps causation
worked in the opposite direction: increased employment of women
led to increased emphasis on laws against sex discrimination. That
fundamental uncertainty in the economic data does not detract,
however, from the increasing importance attached to claims of sexual
harassment. The more women in the workplace, the more occasions
for questionable encounters that support claims of sexual harass-
ment and the greater likelihood that those claims will be pursued.
The bad news seems to be that increased employment of women
might increase the incidence of sexual harassment, but the good
news might be that claims of sexual harassment acquire greater
visibility and receive greater attention.
The rise of the #MeToo movement supports both inferences. It
also raises significant questions about the adequacy of protection
from retaliation, which constitutes the most plausible reason why
96. Id.
97. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 755–65 (1998).
98. Id. at 772–73.
99. Id.
100. Historical Statistics of the United States, Vol. 2, Part B. Work and Welfare, Table
Ba 404-16 (Millennial Edition, 2006).
101. Id.
102. Id.
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victims of alleged harassment do not pursue their complaints. The
weak link in enforcement appears right at the beginning of the
chain of decisions that leads to litigation and liability. The apparatus
for imposing strict liability upon employers never comes into play if
individuals fail to complain of harassment and expose employers to
a genuine risk that damages will be awarded against them.
The Supreme Court, however, has recently increased the thresh-
old of liability on claims of retaliation, requiring proof by the plain-
tiff that her protected activity constituted a “but for” cause of an
adverse employment action.103 Liability for sexual harassment, as
we have seen, is governed by a distinct set of rules, designed in part
to encourage employers to facilitate complaints over sexual harass-
ment. Retaliation, however, for actually complaining about sexual
harassment is governed by the usual rules for proving retaliation.
These rules place a heavier burden upon the plaintiff than the rules
for proving discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, color,
sex, or religion. For these forms of discrimination, the plaintiff need
only prove that the characteristic in question was “a motivating
factor” in an adverse employment decision.104
The Supreme Court reached this conclusion for much the same
reason that it did for age discrimination. The provisions in Title VII
on retaliation, like those in the ADEA, were not amended to require
proof only of “a motivating factor.”105 The default rule in interpreting
“because” of opposition or participation is “but for” causation.106 This
reasoning, as noted earlier with respect to the ADEA, has something
to be said for it in terms of the history of amendment of Title VII.
The provisions in Title VII on discrimination on the basis of race,
color, national origin, sex and religion were amended in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, but not those on retaliation or in the ADEA.107
These considerations of text and legislative history were reinforced
by concern over distinguishing claims of retaliation, like those for age
discrimination, from claims for wrongful discharge. Taking steps to
protest discrimination under Title VII should not generate the equiva-
lent of civil service protection.
Yet this reasoning tacitly assumes that overenforcement poses a
greater problem than underenforcement. It devalues claims of sexual
103. See Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 351–60 (2013).
104. Title VII § 703(m), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
105. Compare Title VII § 703(m), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012) (“race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin was a motivating factor”), with Title VII § 704(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a) (2012) (retaliation “because” plaintiff engaged in protected activity).
106. Title VII § 704, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2012).
107. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (1991),
codified at Title VII § 703(m), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
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harassment and retaliation as exaggerated assertions of victimhood
and identity politics. Yet the lesson of the #MeToo movement is just
the opposite. Commitment to the ideal of sexual equality without
protection of victims who complain about sexual harassment remains
just that—an unrealized abstraction. If prominent women admitted
that they feared economic sanctions for complaining, women with
less visibility and fewer resources at their command would be intim-
idated far more.108 When the harassment occurs within the employ-
ment relationship, the protection from retaliation appears to be
highly inadequate. The easiest way to remedy this deficiency would
be to reconsider the plaintiff’s burden of proving retaliation. A Court
that handed down the original decision on retaliation only few years
ago, however, might well be reluctant to take this step.
A feasible alternative would be to consider the interaction of
retaliation claims with claims for harassment, involving both sexual
harassment and harassment on other grounds as well. The special
standards for liability apply to all such forms of harassment and
they make employers strictly liable for most forms of harassment by
supervisors, subject to a limited defense. That defense places the
burden of proof on the employer to show that it established reason-
able precautions against harassment and that the plaintiff failed to
take advantage of them.109 The burden of proof on these issues rests
with the employer, just as it does in proving a defense to claims of
discrimination subject to the “motivating factor” analysis.110 That
analysis applies also to the underlying harassment claim. A plaintiff
alleging sexual harassment need only show that sex was a motivat-
ing factor in the harassment.111
Requiring proof of retaliation as a “but for” cause does not fit well
with the apparatus that governs the underlying claim of harassment.
Following ordinary doctrinal rules, the Supreme Court requires each
claim to be analyzed according to its own independent requirements.112
But it is hard to see what sense a jury would make of instructions that
sought to distinguish causation and liability on an harassment claim
and the same issues on a retaliation claim. A way out of this doctrinal
dead end would be to merge the standard of causation in proving re-
taliation with the standard on the underlying claim of harassment,
or for that matter, any other kind of intentional discrimination.
108. Nicole B. Porter, Ending Harassment by Starting with Retaliation, 71 STAN. L.
REV. ONLINE 49, 50 (2018).
109. See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 755–65 (1998).
110. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
111. Id. at 79–80.
112. See Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1975) (remedies for
employment discrimination “are separate, distinct, and independent”).
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Freestanding claims of retaliation, without any remaining claim of
intentional discrimination, could still be treated differently, which
describes the posture of the case before the Supreme Court when it
laid down the requirement of proving “but for” causation.113
This solution to underenforcement of sexual harassment claims
admittedly creates a mismatch with the problem it addresses. It
might be regarded as too broad because it would extend to all cases
involving multiple claims of discrimination. It might also be re-
garded as too narrow because it does not supply airtight reassur-
ance to plaintiffs who complain about sexual harassment. Perhaps
better alternatives could be devised. Changing the requirements for
proof of retaliation is only a start, but it takes seriously two problems
in the administration and enforcement of the law: the unwillingness
of victims to complain and the opaque standards of causation in
mixed cases of discrimination and retaliation. These problems
amount to more than exaggerated claims of victimhood; they are
structural defects in making the prohibition against sexual harass-
ment effective.
C. Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Charges of identity politics might also be leveled at the argu-
ments to extend Title VII to prohibit discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation and gender identity.114 Courts have begun to
reach this conclusion in decisions that would undoubtedly have
surprised the legislators who voted for Title VII,115 and the Supreme
Court has granted certiorari in three cases raising these issues.116
Some might conclude that the gap between what Congress thought
it was doing and what courts have interpreted it to have done is
simply too great to be bridged.117 Logic might see anti-gay discrimi-
nation along the same spectrum as sexual stereotyping or same-sex
harassment, both of which constitute recognized forms of sex dis-
crimination.118 Attention to the contemporaneous meaning of “sex”
113. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 345–46.
114. LILLA, supra note 7, at 37.
115. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 571–81 (6th Cir.
2018) (gender identity); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 343–52
(7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (sexual orientation).
116. Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (whether Title VII pro-
hibits discrimination based on sexual orientation); Bostock v. Clayton County, 139 S. Ct.
2049 (2019) (same); B.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 1599
(2019) (whether Title VII prohibits discrimination against transgender people).
117. Hively, 853 F.3d at 362–65 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
118. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998) (same-sex
harassment prohibited by Title VII); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–52
(1989) (opinion of Brennan, J.) (sexual stereotyping prohibited by Title VII).
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in 1964 would lead to a different conclusion, as do the fraught de-
bates and the narrow votes that led to passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.119 The argument that the prohibition against sex dis-
crimination covered sexual orientation and gender identity would
more likely have been made by opponents of the legislation who set
out to discredit the Act.120 We do not, as yet, know how the Supreme
Court will resolve these arguments.
This section makes a different point: that the practical lessons
from enforcing the prohibition against sex discrimination as tradi-
tionally understood pose few obstacles to extending the prohibition to
sexual orientation and gender identity. Apart from sexual harassment,
the prohibition against sex discrimination has received a formal in-
terpretation, preventing employers from considering sex in any way
except as allowed by exceptions exemplified by the narrow terms of
the BFOQ.121 That same approach works for most issues raised by
an extended interpretation of Title VII. Where it breaks down, if at all,
is with respect to religious objections to conforming to an extended
prohibition, a topic taken up in the next section of this Article.122
A formal approach forbidding reliance on sexual orientation or
gender identity, in most employment decisions, has the same advan-
tages of simplicity in compliance and enforcement as existing decisions
on sex discrimination under Title VII. Most of the time, employers
have no reason to consider these individual characteristics in hiring,
firing, and evaluating their employees. Who an employee is sexually
attracted to and what gender identity they accept does not bear on
the great majority of employment decisions. Where it does, the BFOQ
can operate as it usually has—to allow decisions based on sex for a
narrow range of positions.123 For instance, an employer might plau-
sibly claim that someone who has made a gender transition is better
qualified than someone who has not, in advising individuals going
through this process. This is not to say that such an invocation of
the BFOQ automatically should succeed, but it reveals the narrow
range of cases in which it might. By analogy, sex-based dress codes
have been upheld, but only when they are equally burdensome to
members of both sexes.124
119. Carl M. Brauer, Women Activists, Southern Conservatives, and the Prohibition of
Sex Discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 39 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 37, 38 (1983).
120. See id. at 44–45. This is the motive, among others, attributed to Representative
Smith of Virginia, who introduced the prohibition against sex discrimination in Title VII
but then voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a whole. Id.
121. Title VII § 703(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2012).
122. Title VII § 702, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2012).
123. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
124. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc).
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The same holds true of a nontextual exception to Title VII based
on physical privacy, especially in facilities such as restrooms, locker
rooms, and dressing rooms. Sex segregation in these facilities does
not quite fall under the terms of the BFOQ, which deals only with
qualifications for the job. Sex-segregated facilities go more toward
conditions of employment. Analogous issues have arisen under Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, when transgender stu-
dents have sought to use the facilities corresponding to their new
gender identity.125 These cases present conflicts between the gender
identity of one student and the physical privacy concerns of other
students. However this conflict is resolved, it is a familiar one from
cases on the degree of physical privacy that employers can compel
their employees to observe.
How broadly can employers define physical spaces that are acces-
sible only to members of one sex? Many such restrictions, like those
for restrooms, are taken for granted, while others, such as prohibiting
doctors of one sex from examining patients of the opposite sex, are
problematic. No matter where the courts eventually draw the line
between acceptable and unacceptable gender discrimination, they
must consider the legitimacy of concerns over privacy of employers,
customers, and employees. Drawing the line for gender identity raises
new issues, but not ones unknown to the law of sex discrimination.
Proposed legislation to prohibit discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation and gender identity has contained an exception
for religious organizations,126 modeled on one exception in Title VII.
That exception allows such organizations to discriminate on the
basis of religion.127 The proposed legislation would have allowed re-
ligious organizations to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation
and gender identity.128 It appears to be an evident compromise with
religious groups over a subject they might regard as a contentious
addition to the laws against employment discrimination.
A compromise typical of legislation, however, cannot easily be
implemented through interpretation, leaving the practical problem
of accommodating the legitimate concerns of religious groups with
this expanded prohibition. The duty to reasonably accommodate
religious practices will not quite work. That duty protects employees
in the first instance, not employers. If it were used to modify duties
not to discriminate, it would focus almost entirely upon co-employees
and their religious beliefs and practices. The next section discusses
the inherent limits of this approach.
125. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
126. H.R. 1397, S. 822, § 6, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2012).
127. Id.
128. Id.
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D. Religion and Exceptionalism
Equal and opposite to protection of sexual orientation and gender
identity are claims for religious exceptions to these protections. Re-
ligion already receives exceptional treatment under several provisions
of Title VII.129 Like sex discrimination, it is subject to the BFOQ for
occupations in which it is a legitimate qualification for employment.130
The same also holds true, for that matter, for national origin under
Title VII and for age under the ADEA.131 In all these instances, how-
ever, the BFOQ remains “extremely narrow” and therefore seldom
applied.132 Two other exceptions in Title VII understandably allow
religious discrimination by religious organizations, including religious
educational institutions.133 These exceptions have generated little
controversy, probably because they are constitutionally compelled
by the religion clauses of the First Amendment.134
In the opposite direction, the prohibition against religious dis-
crimination extends to religious practices, in addition to religious
belief, unless the employer can demonstrate that these practices can-
not be reasonably accommodated without undue hardship.135 This
duty of reasonable accommodation, unlike the corresponding duty
under the ADA, has proven to be quite limited. All the employer has
to show to establish undue hardship is “more than a de minimis cost”
in accommodating an employee’s religious practices.136 This narrow
construction of the duty of reasonable accommodation reflects con-
stitutional doubts about any statute that favors one religion over
another. To do so arguably constitutes an establishment of religion,
also in violation of the First Amendment. As a result, the explicit
statutory exceptions and extensions for religion in Title VII have not
proven to be of great consequence or generated much controversy.
Where religion does receive distinctive treatment is in the non-
statutory exception for religious ministers. Religious institutions
can discriminate on any ground, not just on the basis of religion, in
hiring, firing, and employing ministers. This exception, like the in-
terpretation of the explicit exceptions and extensions in Title VII,
129. Title VII § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012).
130. Title VII § 701(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(e) (2012).
131. Title VII § 703(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1); ADEA § 4(f)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 623
(2012); W. Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 416–23 (1985) (upholding jury instruction
limiting BFOQ for age); Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 189
n.19 (1982) (raising the issue whether Japanese citizenship could be a BFOQ for certain
positions in American subsidiary of Japanese corporation).
132. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
133. Title VII §§ 702(a), 703(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1(a), 2000e-2(e)(2) (2012).
134. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
135. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(j) 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012).
136. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (emphasis added).
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has its foundations in the First Amendment. As a matter of both free
exercise and avoiding establishment of a religion, the government
cannot interfere in a religious organization’s choice of ministers.137
The Supreme Court adopted this principle in an ADA case, making
clear that the exception for employment of ministers cuts across all,
otherwise prohibited, forms of discrimination.138 The principle gener-
ates an exception to coverage in the sense that employment prac-
tices, with respect to ministers, do not fall within any of the statutes
prohibiting employment discrimination. Ministerial positions fall
completely outside the coverage of these statutes.
Reasonable accommodation began as an extension of the prohi-
bition against religious discrimination in Title VII.139 It added pro-
tection of religious practices, such as not working on the sabbath, to
protection of religious belief, subject to a defense that the employer
could not reasonably accommodate the religious practice without
undue hardship.140 That defense received a broad interpretation,
making the duty to accommodate correspondingly narrow, so much
so that the defense largely eclipsed the duty. In Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison, the Supreme Court required the employer only to
prove that the requested accommodation involved “more than a de
minimis cost.”141 The decision rested mainly on the concern that
accommodating the plaintiff at the expense of other employees would
favor his religious practices over theirs.142 In particular, it would
supersede their seniority rights to avoid working on the weekend,
which is when the plaintiff sought protection for his observance of
the sabbath.143 In the Court’s view, this preference for the plaintiff’s
religious observance raised constitutional issues under the religion
clauses of the First Amendment by disfavoring other employees
whose religion did not require them to observe the sabbath.144 Under
the Establishment Clause, the government cannot favor one religion
over another, and under the Free Exercise Clause, it cannot inhibit
the practice of one religion over another.145
These particular arguments based on the religion clauses faded
in significance as the duty to accommodate was extended to disability,
137. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171,
181–90 (2012).
138. Id. at 186.
139. See Title VII § 701(i), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(i) (2012).
140. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 64 (1977).
141. Id. at 85 (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 81.
143. Id. at 96.
144. Id. at 79–82. The Court later made clear that accommodation could go too far if it
required employers to allow religious believers to avoid work on the sabbath without any
exception for undue hardship. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 708–11 (1985).
145. Caldor, 472 U.S. at 710–11.
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and then to pregnancy. Yet the concern with preserving equality
among employees did not fade. The ADA specifically incorporated the
language of Title VII, although with the alteration that the burden
is upon the employee to show that the accommodation is reasonable,
while the employer only needs to establish that the accommodation
causes undue hardship.146 The issues of reasonable accommodation
and undue hardship overlap, but the Supreme Court separated their
common components in a case, on its facts, much like Hardison. In
U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, the Court held that the ADA did not,
ordinarily, require an employer to assign a disabled employee to an
open position to which other employees were entitled under an es-
tablished seniority system.147 The underlying reason, again, was to
avoid unequal treatment of other employees.148 So, too, in a recent case
extending the duty to accommodate to pregnant workers, the Su-
preme Court emphasized that the fundamental inquiry was whether
other employees were given an accommodation although they were
“similar in their ability or inability to work.”149 Accommodation was
required only when the failure to accommodate amounted to dis-
crimination against pregnant workers.150
Stepping back from the particulars of these decisions, the basic
principle is clear: as more practices and more plaintiffs become eli-
gible for accommodation, granting an accommodation poses a greater
threat to the rights of other employees. As the duty to accommodate
expands in coverage, it diminishes in force as it becomes subject to
qualifications and exceptions. For affirmative duties, like the duty
to accommodate, the negative correlation between coverage and con-
tent takes on greater significance. These duties require the employer
to go out of its way for some employees but not others, enhancing
the latter’s argument that they are denied equal treatment.
As applied to sexual orientation and gender identity, the duty
to accommodate leaves little room for religious objections to minority
sex employees. Take, for instance, the recent constitutional decision
in Masterpiece Cake Shop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission.151
That case involved the refusal of the employer, not an employee, to
provide a wedding cake for a same-sex marriage.152 The cake shop
refused to sell the cake to a same-sex couple, allegedly in violation
146. ADA § 102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012).
147. 535 U.S. 391, 402–06 (2002).
148. Id. at 403–05.
149. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1348–55 (2015) (quoting Title
VII § 701(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)).
150. Id. at 1347.
151. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
152. Id. at 1735.
416 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.              [Vol. 26:391
of a state law that required all organizations that serve the general
public also to serve gays.153 The Supreme Court held that the state
law itself had been discriminatorily applied against expression of
religious views.154 This narrow ground for the decision greatly de-
creases its relevance to employment discrimination cases. First, the
cake shop in question fell below the numerical limits on coverage of
employers under Title VII, which requires regular employment of at
least fifteen employees.155 Small employers are left free of regulation
by the statute. Second, assuming the cake shop was covered, it raises
questions about prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation only if the prohibition is itself enforced in a discriminatory
fashion. The duty to accommodate intersects only with discrimina-
tory enforcement, not with the prohibition itself.
Employers themselves are not entitled to accommodations under
Title VII. Religious organizations, as noted in the previous section,
do get the benefit of a ministerial exception which allows them com-
plete freedom in choosing who will speak for their religion.156 That
categorical exception to coverage has no counterpart, however, in a
duty to accommodate employers, as opposed to employees, based on
religion. Moreover, if the employer relies indirectly on its duty to
accommodate the religious practices of objecting employees, the ac-
commodation must involve no “more than de minimis cost.”157 Allowing
discrimination against sexual minorities, in violation of otherwise
applicable law, would not qualify as a de minimis cost. The Supreme
Court interpreted the “undue burden” exception broadly in order to
prevent benefits for some employees from coming at the expense of
other employees.158 Recognizing an exception to the duty not to dis-
criminate based on a duty to accommodate would result in precisely
such a zero-sum redistribution of benefits to one group of employees
at the expense of another. Such reasoning has never generated an
exception to prohibitions against discrimination on grounds other
than sexual orientation.
Some might object at this point that the inadequacy of accom-
modation to inject flexibility into the duty not to discriminate against
sexual minorities demonstrates why the latter duty should be en-
acted by legislation rather than recognized by interpretation. Even
the proposed federal legislation that contained such an exception,
153. Id. at 1728.
154. Id. at 1729–32.
155. § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012).
156. H.R. 1397, S. 822, § 6, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2012).
157. Naomi C. Earp, EEOC Compliance Manual (2008), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy
/docs/religion.pdf. See H.R. 1431, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (2007).
158. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719,
1724 (2018).
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however, limited it to religious organizations.159 Reasoning from the
duty to accommodate contains no such limitation. It carries flexibil-
ity to the extreme at the risk of nullification. It would make far more
sense to amplify the scope of the BFOQ, and the related nonstatutory
exception for physical privacy, to take account of circumstances, not
necessarily based on religious belief or practices, in which adjust-
ment is warranted. The outcome of the ongoing debate over bath-
room and locker room privacy with respect to transgender students
under Title IX might provide the degree of nuance to accommodate
the interests of all employees with concerns about these issues
under Title VII.160 The accommodation in that manner would be a
two-way street that recognizes interests in privacy all around, both
of transitioning employees and their co-workers. The same would be
true of a BFOQ applied to sexual orientation.
IV. AGE, DISABILITY, AND COMMON COVERAGE
A. Paradoxes of Coverage Under the ADEA
The ADEA might be taken as an exemplar of special interest
legislation and identity politics. It only protects individuals who are
at least 40 years old and only from discrimination because they are
too old, not because they are too young.161 Based on these limitations,
the ADEA could be taken as a paradigm of a statute that identifies
a “protected class.” As noted earlier, unlike Title VII, it does not
protect “any individual.”162 Yet this nominally limited coverage is
effectively universal, in a way that surprisingly expands the constit-
uency of those who benefit from employment discrimination law. The
proverbial lower-class white male who is disaffected by civil rights
law turns out to be the beneficiary of the ADEA as soon as he turns
40. As the Supreme Court said in denying strict scrutiny to age-based
classifications by government, “even old age does not define a ‘dis-
crete and insular’ group . . . . Instead, it marks a stage that each of
us will reach if we live out our normal span.”163
The protection that the ADEA affords to everyone in this sense
became even stronger as its coverage expanded unobtrusively but
decisively to first raise, and then eliminate, the ceiling on the age of
159. See note 131 supra and accompanying text.
160. See G.G. v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated and
remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (order requiring bathroom access to transgender student
vacated and remanded).
161. ADEA § 12, 29 U.S.C. § 631 (2012).
162. ADEA § 4(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2012).
163. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1976) (per
curiam).
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covered plaintiffs. As noted earlier, when it was originally enacted in
1967, the Act only covered plaintiffs from age 40 to age 64.164 An
amendment in 1978165 raised the ceiling to age 69 and another
amendment in 1986166 eliminated the ceiling altogether. An exception
still applies the age 65 ceiling to employees in executive or policymak-
ing positions in certain circumstances and another exception for fire-
fighters and law enforcement officers remains now only in very limited
form.167 An exception for university professors was entirely repealed.168
The net effect of the expansion in coverage was effectively to
ban mandatory retirement, as Congress made clear in successive
amendments to the Act that superseded decisions of the Supreme
Court preserving the practice in some form.169 The Act, instead, per-
mits voluntary retirement plans, which can take account of age, as
can retirement plans and other fringe benefits made available to
employees.170 The latter provisions might seem to be unexceptional,
since the cost of such benefits correlate with age, but they stand in
marked contrast to the prohibition against sex discrimination in
Title VII, which prohibits any consideration of sex in fringe benefit
plans, regardless of its correlation with cost.171
The prohibition upon mandatory retirement in the ADEA subjects
all decisions to discharge employees age 40 or older to re-examination
for age discrimination. Since employers almost always know, by rec-
ords or appearances, that an employee has reached age 40, the ques-
tion whether they took the employee’s age into account in making a
discharge decision becomes an issue to be determined on all the facts
of each case. Dispelling the inference of age discrimination usually
turns on how well the employee has performed, and the relative
qualifications of any individual hired as a replacement. That line of
reasoning then causes age discrimination cases to resemble cases of
wrongful discharge, which explicitly consider the employer’s evalua-
tion of the employee’s performance and qualifications.172 Once the
164. ADEA § 12, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 607 (1967).
165. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256,
§ 3(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978).
166. Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 2,
100 Stat. 3342 (1986).
167. ADEA § 4(j), 29 U.S.C. § 623(j) (2012).
168. ADEA § 4(m), 29 U.S.C. § 623(m) (2012).
169. For an account of this development, see Rutherglen, supra note 5, at 174–75.
170. ADEA § 4(f), (i), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f), (i) (2012).
171. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 685 n.26
(1983); City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716–17
(1978).
172. For analysis of the different terms and effects of laws against discrimination and
against wrongful discharge, see Julie C. Suk, Discrimination at Will: Job Security Pro-
tection and Equal Employment Opportunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73, 77–84 (2007).
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ceiling on coverage of the ADEA was lifted, it became a likely vehicle
for creating the effective equivalent in federal law of state wrongful
discharge law.
The Supreme Court defused this risk in an important decision
increasing the plaintiff’s burden of proof in ADEA cases, just as it did
later in retaliation cases under Title VII, as compared to the plaintiff’s
burden in other Title VII cases.173 Amendments to Title VII allowed
a plaintiff to prove intentional discrimination by establishing that
race, national origin, color, sex or religion was “a motivating factor”
in an employment decision.174 This showing was then subject to a
defense, applicable to compensatory remedies, if the defendant car-
ried the burden of proving that it would have made the same deci-
sion anyway.175 Those amendments did not extend to the ADEA,
which preserved language drawn from the original version of Title
VII.176 The Supreme Court concluded from the absence of amend-
ments that the ADEA followed the ordinary principle of tort litigation
requiring proof of “but for” causation.177 The plaintiff in an ADEA
case must prove that age was a necessary factor in the disputed em-
ployment decision, in the sense that the defendant would not have
reached the same decision without considering age.178
The Court’s reasoning based on the history of amendments to
Title VII, but not the ADEA, has some force. Exactly the difference
between a “motivating factor” and a “but for” cause remains some-
what obscure, as does its compelling force as a general principle of
tort law. How does causation, which usually applies to physical pro-
cesses, apply to institutional decisions of employers based on the
motivation of one or more supervisors? Leaving these considerations
to one side, however, a further reason for limiting liability under the
ADEA has to do with keeping it distinct from the law of wrongful
discharge. Although not raised by the Court, this concern permeates
employment discrimination law, which focuses on a restricted inquiry
into an employer’s reasons for a disputed decision. This decision can
be made for no reason or any reason, so long as it is not a discrimi-
natory reason. Wrongful discharge claims, instead, necessitate an
inquiry into how good the employer’s reasons are overall.179 If the
specific inquiry into age discrimination merges into this general
173. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 177–78 (2009); see notes 104–08 supra
and accompanying text.
174. Title VII § 703(m), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
175. Title VII § 706(g)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012).
176. See Title VII.
177. Gross, 557 U.S. at 173–79.
178. ADEA § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012).
179. See, e.g., McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368, 370–73 (7th
Cir. 1992).
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inquiry into performance and qualifications, claims under the ADEA
slide imperceptibly into claims for wrongful discharge. Increasing
the plaintiff’s burden of proof increases the barriers to sliding down
this slippery slope. This whole process starts, however, with the
breadth of the ADEA’s coverage and its accompanying prohibition
on mandatory retirement.
B. Expanded Coverage and Limited Accommodation Under the ADA
The ADA stands at the epicenter of controversies over coverage
and special treatment by way of reasonable accommodation. It there-
fore appears to be another paradigm of special interest legislation.
But appearances are deceiving. Like the ADEA, the ADA has nomi-
nally limited coverage, only of individuals who have a disability as
defined under the statute, but coverage has expanded so that it has
become potentially unlimited. Moreover, the combined effect of both
statutes together affords increased protection to workers as they grow
older. Such individuals are more likely to confront both age and
disability discrimination, as they become more likely to suffer from
physical or psychological impairments. They might not otherwise
benefit from the laws against employment discrimination, but they
increasingly come under the protection of these statutes as they age.
In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court took a strict approach
to coverage under the Act, apparently animated by the fear that if
coverage extended too broadly, then nearly anyone could make a claim
under the Act.180 In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,181 the Court re-
quired disabilities to be evaluated in their corrected state, so that the
plaintiffs’ poor eyesight had to be evaluated as it was corrected by
eyeglasses. That led directly to the conclusion that their impairment
was not, as the Act required, one “that substantially limits one or
more major life activities of such individual.”182 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court relied on the estimate in the original version
of the ADA that “43,000,000 Americans” have a covered disability and
they constitute a “discrete and insular minority.”183 To cover vision
problems would, the Court implied, push the estimated coverage of
the Act much higher, making covered individuals a majority rather
than a minority of Americans.184 The Court reached a similar conclu-
sion in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,185
180. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482–83 (1999).
181. Id.
182. ADA § 3(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2012).
183. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 485.
184. Id. at 494–95 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
185. 534 U.S. 184, 200–01 (2002).
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casting doubt on whether working could be a major life activity, so
that exclusion from a particular job or range of jobs could trigger
coverage under the Act.186 This argument for coverage, if taken liter-
ally, posed a danger of circularity: a plaintiff denied a job because of
an impairment could then argue that the denial itself demonstrated
that the impairment limited a major life activity.
Further arguments in Sutton and Toyota Motor also reveal the
Court’s uneasiness with expanded coverage of the ADA. For instance,
the Court also refused to defer to regulations of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission that broadly interpreted the Act’s
provisions on coverage.187 These features of the opinion need not
detain us, because both decisions were largely overruled by the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, which disapproved of both decisions by
name.188 Congress rejected the Court’s misgivings about extending
coverage too broadly.189 It dramatically lowered the barriers to a
plaintiff who established that he or she met the initial threshold of
coverage under the Act. Particularly if a plaintiff sought to prove
coverage by “being regarded as having” an impairment that substan-
tially limited a major life activity, the plaintiff need only show that the
impairment was not “transitory and minor” and that the employer
regarded it as substantially impairing a major life activity.190 More-
over, the EEOC has promulgated, under authority newly conferred
by the 2008 Act, a list of broadly defined impairments that support
coverage.191 In a similar vein, Congress also enacted a list of major
life activities, which now includes working despite the suggestions
to the contrary in Sutton and Toyota Motor.192
All these changes eased the plaintiff’s burden of proving the
existence of a covered impairment. That is not all there is to coverage,
however. The plaintiff must also prove that he or she is a “qualified
individual” who can perform the essential functions of the job “with
or without reasonable accommodation.”193 This further inquiry into
coverage often merges with the merits of the plaintiff’s claim. Cover-
age, in this respect, becomes indistinguishable from the merits. Rea-
sonable accommodation goes to the employer’s obligations under the
ADA and lack of qualifications constitutes a defense to any claim of
employment discrimination.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 193–94; Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479.
188. Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 2, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
189. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 1110-325 (2008).
190. ADA § 3(3), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3) (2012).
191. ADA § 5(6), 42 U.S.C. § 12205a (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2018).
192. ADA § 3(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2012).
193. ADA §§ 101(8), 102(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a) (2012).
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Coverage under the ADA also merges with the merits in another
way. Individuals who are covered only because they are “regarded
as” disabled do not get the benefit of the duty of reasonable accom-
modation.194 This result makes intuitive sense because it is difficult
to understand how an employer can accommodate a disability that
the plaintiff does not actually have. But it also responds to concerns
that coverage of the Act extends too broadly. The affirmative obliga-
tion of an employer to reasonably accommodate comes into play only
if the plaintiff can establish the existence of an actual disability or
a record of having one. Despite the expansion of coverage in the
2008 Act, the ADA still limits the substantive obligations it imposes
on employers.195 These limitations derive from coverage in the sense
that they mitigate the consequences of its expansion. The net effect
runs counter to any simple, unifying theory of what constitutes
unlawful discrimination. The actual contours of the law adjust to a
wider range of competing tendencies than any such theory can
admit, as noted throughout this Article.
CONCLUSION
The disjunction between principles of equality and limitations
on coverage comes up at every level of discrimination law. At the
highest level of abstraction, the implications of equality dictate uni-
versal coverage. Yet even when a statute literally commands such
coverage, for instance, Title VII in protecting “any individual,”196
qualifications and exceptions creep in as the statute is interpreted
and enforced. At the most concrete level, statutory provisions on
coverage inevitably make arbitrary distinctions at the margin. Why
does the ADEA cover individuals age 40, but not individuals age 39?
In most cases, these provisions can be rationalized in some way, but
the rationale, more often than not, ranges over a variety of consider-
ations, some of which bear only the most distant connection to ab-
stract equality. If the law necessarily takes on an arbitrary edge on
issues of coverage, then it also necessarily qualifies the goals that
it seeks to achieve. Instead of lamenting departures from the logic
of the law, it might be better to accept the lessons of experience and
embrace pragmatic compromises that would be made anyway.
Inherently contested concepts, like discrimination, do not easily
yield widespread acquiescence in their meaning, interpretation, and
enforcement. In the current political climate, they are far more likely
to generate flashpoints for heated disagreement. They could be taken
194. ADA § 501(h), 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h) (2012).
195. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 2, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
196. Title VII § 703(a)–(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)–(d) (2012).
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as the occasion for identity politics, both on the left by those seeking
additional prohibitions against discrimination, and on the right by
those left out of the ordinary application of those prohibitions. Dis-
aggregating the concept of discrimination, and the legal prohibitions
based on it, will not make these disagreements go away. It does, or
so this Article has argued, offer the promise of channeling contro-
versy to narrower issues more likely to generate constructive com-
promises among competing interests. It does not promise an end to
the culture wars, but a modus vivendi that accommodates different
visions of equality. These differing visions undermine claims for a
unified theory of prohibited discrimination and the hope that it can
resolve persistent disagreement. Entrenched differences are more
likely to yield to pragmatic considerations characteristic of provi-
sions on coverage and enforcement of existing law.
